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Marquette University
This paper investigates the eﬀectiveness of central bank
forward guidance while relaxing two standard macroeconomic
assumptions: rational expectations and frictionless ﬁnancial
markets. The results show that the addition of ﬁnancial frictions ampliﬁes the diﬀerences between rational expectations
and adaptive learning to forward guidance. During a period
of economic crisis, output under rational expectations displays more favorable responses to forward guidance than under
adaptive learning. These diﬀerences are exacerbated when
compared with a similar analysis without ﬁnancial frictions.
Thus, monetary policymakers should consider the way in which
expectations and credit frictions are modeled when examining
the eﬀects of forward guidance.
JEL Codes: D84, E30, E44, E50, E52, E58, E60.

1.

Introduction

The conventional monetary policy tool of lowering overnight interest rates was exhausted when the zero lower bound (ZLB) on
U.S. short-term nominal interest rates was eﬀectively reached during the 2007–09 global ﬁnancial crisis. Central banks around the
world responded by pursuing “unconventional” monetary policies to
stimulate their economies. One of these alternative tools was forward guidance, where the central bank communicates to the public
∗
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information about the future path of the policy rate. For instance,
the Federal Reserve issued forward guidance in the September 2012
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statement: “The Committee also . . . anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015.”
In addition, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Woodford (2012)
argue that communication on the future path of interest rates can
have stimulative economic eﬀects. Standard New Keynesian models
(e.g., Woodford 2003) predict agents being forward looking when
making current-period decisions. If households and ﬁrms expect
higher interest rates in response to future expansions, economic
activity today may be limited. However, if a central bank communicates a low policy rate through part of the expansion, output today
will not be as constrained.
The eﬀectiveness of forward guidance hinges on two key
channels—ﬁnancial markets and expectations—that are largely overlooked in previous related forward guidance literature. The addition of credit frictions in macroeconomic models is not a standard
assumption. Frictionless ﬁnancial markets are largely assumed for
simplicity and not to model realistic features of an economy. However, this absence removes the prominent role of credit frictions in
the macroeconomy and a key medium through which forward guidance inﬂuences the economy. In addition, the way in which privatesector expectations about macroeconomic variables (e.g., output
and inﬂation) respond to forward guidance deﬁnes a key channel
through which this unconventional monetary policy operates. The
standard way to model expectations in macroeconomic models is
the rational expectations hypothesis. However, this expectations
formation scheme makes strong assumptions about the amount of
knowledge agents possess when constructing forecasts. Therefore,
it is natural to investigate the eﬀectiveness of forward guidance
when agents construct forecasts through a more realistic theory of
expectations formation.
This paper studies the eﬀectiveness of forward guidance in
an environment where credit market frictions persist and rational
expectations has been replaced by an adaptive learning rule similar to one proposed by Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans
and Honkapohja (2001). In particular, the economic environment is
based on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s dynamic stochastic
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general equilibrium (FRBNY DSGE) model presented in both Del
Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) and Del Negro et al. (2013).
The model adds to a standard DSGE model both ﬁnancial frictions
and central bank communication about the future path of interest
rates. A standard monetary policy rule is augmented with anticipated shocks as in Laséen and Svensson (2011). The anticipated
shocks represent future changes from a normal interest rate rule
that the central bank communicates to agents today. The shocks are
also included to model time-contingent forward guidance in which
the central bank communicates to the public a forward guidance
completion date.
Agents are assumed to form expectations of future macroeconomic variables via two options: the rational expectations hypothesis
or a popular alternative called adaptive learning. Rational expectations is a strong assumption. Agents form expectations based on the
true model of the economy, as they know the model’s deep parameters, structure of the model, beliefs of other agents, and distribution
of the error terms. A popular alternative to rational expectations
is adaptive learning in which agents behave as real-life economists
(see, for instance, Evans and Honkapohja 2013). Adaptive learning
agents formulate forecasts of future endogenous variables by creating
an econometric model using variables based on the solution found
under rational expectations. They estimate the parameters of the
model using ordinary least squares and appropriately adjust their
forecasts to new data each period.1
The inclusion of ﬁnancial frictions follows Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) and
adds a realistic feature. The new components model the borrowing and lending of funds seen in the real economy by adding two
types of agents to a standard medium-scale DSGE model: banks and
entrepreneurs. Banks take in deposits from households and lend to
entrepreneurs. The latter type of agents use these funds to purchase
capital and rent it to intermediate goods producers. Banks charge
entrepreneurs a premium over the riskless interest rate, as there is
1
When they construct forecasts each period, adaptive learning agents do not
take into account that they will be updating their expectations in the future.
They believe their forecasts to be optimal in each period. The reader can refer
to Kreps (1998) for additional description on anticipated utility.
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a possibility they may default. This “spread” ﬂuctuates based on
entrepreneurs’ leverage and an idiosyncratic shock that aﬀects the
perceived riskiness of entrepreneurs by banks. If riskiness increases,
entrepreneurs have a harder time receiving funds and, thus, are constrained in the amount of capital they can funnel to the production
side of the economy. The spread or riskiness shock captures how the
ﬁnancial sector contributed to the Great Recession. Del Negro et al.
(2013) explain that spread shocks caused about half the decrease in
U.S. output during the Great Recession.
The results show that the addition of ﬁnancial frictions ampliﬁes
the diﬀerences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance statements. These outcomes are ﬁrst shown
under impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to forward
guidance shocks. For instance, output’s response to forward guidance is stronger under rational expectations than under adaptive
learning. The results are also presented during a period of economic crisis (e.g., a recession). The central bank responds to the
recession by communicating to the public that the nominal interest rate will equal zero throughout the forward guidance horizon.
This exercise shows that the eﬀects of forward guidance are larger
under rational expectations relative to adaptive learning. Speciﬁcally, the value of output is higher under rational expectations than
under adaptive learning throughout the forward guidance horizon.
In addition, when the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions in the model is
reduced, the “wedge” that existed between the responses of rational
expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance diminishes.
This result is shown by comparing impulse responses when varying the parameter that governs the elasticity of the spread with
respect to leverage of entrepreneurs. For instance, the disparity of
the impulse responses of output between rational expectations and
adaptive learning dampens as this parameter decreases.
The reasons for the diﬀerences arise from the amount of knowledge that agents are assumed to hold and the ﬁnancial frictions
present in the FRBNY DSGE model. Under rational expectations,
agents base their expectations of future macroeconomic variables
on the true model of the economy. Thus, rational expectations
agents compute precise expectations about how forward guidance
statements aﬀect future macroeconomic variables. However, adaptive learning agents are not endowed with this level of knowledge.
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Instead, they estimate the eﬀects of forward guidance using their
econometric model of the economy. In addition, the inclusion of a
ﬁnancial sector magniﬁes the diﬀerences between rational expectations and adaptive learning agents. The adaptive learning agents
must estimate how forward guidance will alleviate the recession by
forecasting not only future variables concerning households and ﬁrms
but also the ﬁnancial sector. This creates more errors by the adaptive
learning agents relative to their rational expectations counterparts.
These previous reasons create bigger diﬀerences between the two
types of expectations assumptions.
Overall, the results of the paper suggest a main ﬁnding for
monetary policymakers: the eﬀects of forward guidance depend on
the manner in which expectations and ﬁnancial frictions are modeled. Under the assumption of rational expectations, forward guidance produces more favorable values of output than under adaptive learning. When including credit frictions, these diﬀerences are
magniﬁed.

1.1

Previous Literature

This paper contributes to the growing literature on forward guidance. The seminal work by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) explains
the importance of the expectations channel on the economy. The
path of short-term interest rates aﬀects long-term interest rates and
asset prices, and thus the management of interest rate expectations
is pertinent for a central bank. McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson
(2016) explain that the extreme responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance found in standard macroeconomic models
depend on the assumption of complete markets. The addition of
precautionary savings into a macroeconomic model limits the eﬀectiveness of forward guidance at the ZLB. The results from Del Negro,
Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) and Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian
(2015) display unusually large responses of the macroeconomic variables to forward guidance relative to the data. Del Negro, Giannoni,
and Patterson (2012) label this outcome “the forward guidance puzzle.” This present paper suggests that the unusually large responses
may be due to the rational expectations assumption employed in
Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012), and a more realistic
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expectation formation assumption (e.g., adaptive learning) produces
results that better match the data.
The current paper follows recent literature examining the eﬀectiveness of forward guidance. De Graeve, Ilbas, and Wouters (2014)
study the eﬀects of forward guidance through a diﬀerent lens than
the expectations channel. They ﬁnd that the eﬀects of this unconventional monetary policy tool vary depending on the type of forward guidance and the underlying reasons for implementing it (e.g.,
monetary stimulus or sign of future economic crisis). Levin et al.
(2010) explain that the power of forward guidance is sensitive to
the type of structural shock aﬀecting the economy. Swanson and
Williams (2014) show that Federal Reserve forward guidance statements inﬂuence the economy by aﬀecting medium- and longerterm interest rates. Kool and Thornton (2015) test the eﬀectiveness
of forward guidance across four countries: New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, and the United States. They ﬁnd that forward guidance
helped market participants forecast future short-term yields. In addition, Cole (2015) examines the eﬀects of forward guidance across
rational expectations and adaptive learning assumptions, but utilizes a DSGE model without ﬁnancial frictions. The present paper
shows that the diﬀerences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance are ampliﬁed when a DSGE model
is expanded to include a ﬁnancial sector.
This paper ﬁts into the literature on expectation formation and
policy. Caputo, Medina, and Soto (2011) use a DSGE model with
adaptive learning and a ﬁnancial accelerator as in Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999). They ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial accelerator model
with adaptive learning leads to large business cycle ﬂuctuations, but
a central bank that aggressively responds to inﬂation can limit the
volatility in output and inﬂation. When the ﬁscal authority communicates information about the future path of government purchases
and taxes, Mitra, Evans, and Honkapohja (2012) show that output multipliers match the data more under adaptive learning than
under rational expectations. Eusepi and Preston (2010) examine
the beneﬁts of central bank communication in which agents have
an incomplete model of the economy when constructing expectations. When a central bank provides more information to the public
about policy (e.g., the variables within a monetary policy rule), the
macroeconomic variables exhibit greater stability, as agents are able
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to construct more precise forecasts. Woodford (2010) studies optimal monetary policy in which the central bank understands agents
may not form forecasts via the rational expectations hypothesis. He
stresses the importance of policy commitment (e.g., guaranteeing
stable inﬂation) regardless of agents’ expectations not being model
consistent. Slobodyan and Wouters (2012) examine the mediumscale DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007) under the assumption of adaptive learning. The DSGE model’s match to the data
is on par with or exceeds the results under adaptive learning than
rational expectations.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2
presents the DSGE model with ﬁnancial frictions. Section 3 discusses expectations formation under both rational expectations and
adaptive learning. Section 4 contains the results of forward guidance under both types of expectations formations. Impulse response
functions, forward guidance during an economic crisis, and the
importance of ﬁnancial frictions for forward guidance are examined. The results are also studied when the degree in which adaptive learning agents discount previous observations is varied. In
addition, the last two portions of section 4 study the impulse
responses to a spread shock and the contribution of non-forward
guidance shocks to the paper’s main results, respectively. Section 5
concludes.

2.

Model

The aggregate dynamics of the economy are described by a mediumscale DSGE model with ﬁnancial frictions following Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) and Del Negro et al. (2013). It contains
a large number of frictions found in standard DSGE models (e.g.,
Smets and Wouters 2007). These include price and wage stickiness,
price and wage indexation, habit formation in consumption, capital utilization, and investment adjustment costs. The model also
includes credit frictions following Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010). The remainder
of this section presents a brief description of the model followed by
the log-linearized equations.
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Description
2.1.1

Households and Labor Packers

Each household j ∈ [0, 1] maximizes the sum of its expected discounted utility. They receive utility from consumption and disutility
from providing work to ﬁrms. A household supplies its work to labor
packers (e.g., employment agencies). The latter group bundles labor
to sell to intermediate goods producers in a perfectly competitive
market. In addition, a household can put its wealth in governmentissued bonds, deposits held at banks, and money. As will be discussed
later, the deposits held at banks are important, as entrepreneurs use
them to purchase capital. The entrepreneurs funnel capital to the
production side of the economy.
The frictions in the household sector take the form of habit formation in consumption and wage stickiness. Households have market
power in the labor market and choose their nominal wage subject
to the amount of work demanded by intermediate goods producers. Following Calvo (1983), a household has probability (1 − ζw ) of
choosing its wage each period, and probability ζw of not being able
to choose its wage. Under the latter scenario, wages are indexed
to either previous-period’s inﬂation times last-period’s productivity
with probability ιw , or steady-state inﬂation times the economy’s
growth rate with probability (1 − ιw ).
2.1.2

Firms

There exist two types of ﬁrms: intermediate and ﬁnal goods producers. Intermediate goods producers operate in a monopolistically
competitive market and use labor and capital to create diﬀerentiated products to sell to ﬁnal goods producers. The source of their
labor and capital comes from households (via employment agencies)
and entrepreneurs, respectively. The intermediate goods producers
are subject to nominal price rigidities in the form of a Calvo (1983)
pricing scheme. In each period, ﬁrms have a probability (1 − ζp ) of
freely changing their price. The remaining fraction ζp of ﬁrms index
their price to either previous-period’s inﬂation with probability ιp
or the steady-state rate of inﬂation with probability (1 − ιp ). The
ﬁnal goods producers conduct business in a competitive market and
bundle the intermediate goods into one composite good.
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Financial Sector and Capital Producers

The modeling of credit frictions starts with two agents: banks and
entrepreneurs. Banks pay interest on deposits received from households and use the funds to issue loans to entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs use the funds to purchase capital from capital producers
and rent it to intermediate goods ﬁrms. Banks also charge entrepreneurs a premium over the risk-free interest rate, as there is a risk
of default. This “spread” varies with entrepreneurs’ leverage, that
is, the ratio of the value of capital to net worth. The spread widens
as the value of entrepreneurs’ capital, which is positively related to
the amount it borrows from banks, increases relative to its own net
worth. In every period, an idiosyncratic shock also aﬀects the amount
of capital that entrepreneurs manage. An adverse shock shrinks the
amount of capital they can lend and, thus, the proceeds they earn
from lending to intermediate goods ﬁrms. Consequently, this negative shock decreases the ability of entrepreneurs to repay their loans
to the bank. In addition, there exist spread shocks which aﬀect the
volatility of the idiosyncratic shock. This event can reﬂect entrepreneurs’ perceived riskiness by banks to repay loans. If the riskiness
increases, banks will increase the amount it charges entrepreneurs
for loans. As the cost of borrowing rises, the ability of entrepreneurs
to buy capital to rent to intermediate goods producers diminishes.
Capital producers operate in a perfectly competitive market and
are responsible for the creation of the stock of capital. They purchase
a part of output from ﬁnal goods producers and transform it into
capital subject to adjustment costs. They also purchase a fraction
of capital from entrepreneurs. These two sources of capital comprise the amount of capital for use next period. Capital producers
sell capital back to entrepreneurs who then rent it to intermediate
goods producers.

2.1.4

Government Policy

The model includes both monetary and ﬁscal policies. The monetary authorities follow a Taylor-type rule and adjust the short-term
nominal interest rate to changes in output, inﬂation, monetary policy shock, and anticipated or forward guidance shocks. The ﬁscal
authorities collect lump-sum taxes and satisfy a government budget
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constraint. There also exists a government spending shock which
captures exogenous ﬂuctuations in aggregate demand.

2.2

Log-Linearized Equations

The following are the log-linearized equations that describe the
DSGE model with ﬁnancial frictions. The “ ˆ ” and “ * ” symbols
represent log-deviations from steady state and steady-state values,
respectively. The Êt indicates (potentially) non-rational expectations, while Et denotes the model-consistent rational expectations
operator. From the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions, one can get
the consumption Euler equation:
ξˆt = R̂t + Êt ξˆt+1 − Êt π̂t+1 ,

(1)

where ξˆt is the marginal utility of consumption, R̂t is the nominal
interest rate paid on government issued bonds and controlled by the
central bank, and π̂t is the inﬂation rate. Consumption is deﬁned
according to the following equation:
(eγ − hβ)(eγ − h)ξˆt = eγ (eγ − h)b̂t − (e2γ + βh2 )ĉt + heγ ĉt−1
− βh(eγ − h)Êt b̂t+1 + βheγ Êt ĉt+1 ,

(2)

where ĉt is consumption, b̂t is a stochastic shock to household utility,
β is the discount factor, h represents habit formation in consumption, and eγ is the steady-state (gross) growth rate of the economy.
The demand for money by households is given by
vm m̂t = −

R∗

1
R̂t − ξˆt ,
−1

(3)

where m̂t is money.
Households have market power in the labor market. Wages are
chosen by households according to a Calvo (1983) scheme. In each
period, a fraction 1 − ζw of households can choose their wage.
The remaining ζw of households index wages to either previousperiod’s inﬂation times last-period’s productivity with probability
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ιw , or steady-state inﬂation times the economy’s growth rate with
probability (1 − ιw ). The optimal reset wage equation is given by






1 + λw
1 + λw ˆ
w̃t + 1 + ζw βνl
ŵt
1 + νl
λw
λw


1 + λw
ˆt+1 + ŵt+1 )
= ζw β 1 + νl
Êt (w̃
λw
e−γ
+ (1 − ζw β)(e2γ + h2 β) γ
b̂t + ϕ̂t + (1 − ζw β)(νl L̂t − ξˆt )
e −h




1 + λw
1 + λw
π̂t + ζw β 1 + νl
Êt π̂t+1 .
− ζw βιw 1 + νl
λw
λw
(4)

ˆt represents the freely chosen wage by households, ŵt is the aggrew̃
gate wage, L̂t is aggregate labor, and ϕ̂t is a stochastic shock that
aﬀects the marginal utility of labor. λw deﬁnes the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated labor services, and νl represents the
inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. In addition, the aggregate
wage equation is given by
ŵt = ŵt−1 + ιw π̂t−1 − π̂t +

1 − ζw ˆ
w̃t .
ζw

(5)

The production side of the economy is populated by
intermediate- and ﬁnal-goods-producing ﬁrms. The intermediate
goods ﬁrms operate in a monopolistically competitive market, while
ﬁnal goods producers conduct business in a competitive market.
Prices do not freely adjust in the former market. Speciﬁcally, a
fraction (1 − ζp ) of ﬁrms can freely adjust its price every period.
The remaining ζp of ﬁrms either index prices to previous-period’s
inﬂation with probability ιp or to steady-state rate of inﬂation with
probability (1 − ιp ). Consequently, the Phillips curve is given by
π̂t =

ιp ζp
β
π̂t−1 +
Êt π̂t+1
1 + ιp β
1 + ιp β
+

(1 − ζp β)(1 − ζp )
1
m̂ct +
λ̂f,t ,
(1 + ιp β)ζp
(1 + ιp β)ζp

(6)
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where λ̂f,t represents a cost-push shock. m̂ct is marginal cost and is
deﬁned by
m̂ct = (1 − α)ŵt + αr̂tk ,

(7)

where r̂tk is the rental rate of capital and α captures capital’s share
of output. Intermediate goods ﬁrms utilize both labor and capital in
a Cobb-Douglas production function given by
ŷt =

α(y ∗ + Φ)
(1 − α)(y ∗ + Φ)
+
k̂
L̂t ,
t
y∗
y∗

(8)

where k̂t represents eﬀective capital in the economy and Φ is ﬁxed
costs in production.
The model’s resource constraint satisﬁes
ŷt = ĝt +

c∗
i∗
rk∗ k∗
ĉt +
ı̂t +
ût ,
c ∗ +i∗
c ∗ +i∗
c ∗ +i∗

(9)

where ı̂t is investment, ût is capital utilization, and ĝt is a government spending shock capturing exogenous aggregate demand ﬂuctuations in the economy.
The capital-to-labor ratio is given by
k̂t = ŵt − r̂tk + L̂t .

(10)

The ﬁnancial side of the economy is populated by banks and
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs borrow funds from banks to purchase
capital from capital producers and rent it to intermediate goods producers. The amount of funds entrepreneurs can borrow is a function
of their net worth, which evolves according to the following equation:
ˆ k − π̂ ) − ζ (R̂
k
ˆ
n̂t = ζn,R˜k (R̃
t
n,R
t−1 − π̂t ) + ζn,qK (q̂t−1 + k̄t−1 )
t
+ ζn,n n̂t−1 + γ̂t −

ζn,μe e
ζn,σω
μ̂t−1 −
σ̂ω,t−1 ,
e
ζsp,μ
ζsp,σω

(11)

where q̂tk is the price of capital, k̄ˆt measures the amount of installed
capital, γ̂t deﬁnes the time-varying exogenous fraction of entrepreneurs that survive each period shock, μ̂et is a bankruptcy cost shock,
and σ̂ω,t is a spread shock. ζn,R̃k , ζn,R , ζn,qK , ζn,n , ζn,μe , and ζn,σω are
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the elasticities of net worth with respect to the return on capital,
nominal interest rate, price of capital, net worth itself, bankruptcy
cost shock, and the spread shock, respectively. ζsp,σω represents the
elasticity of the spread with respect to the volatility of the spread
shock. ζsp,μe is the elasticity of the spread with respect to the bankˆ k is the gross return on capital entrepreneurs
ruptcy cost shock. R̃
t

receive from renting capital to intermediate goods producers and is
deﬁned by
ˆ k − π̂ =
R̃
t
t

r∗k
1−δ
k
,
r̂k + k
q̂ k − q̂t−1
r∗k + (1 − δ) t
r∗ + (1 − δ) t

(12)

where δ is the depreciation rate. The expected excess return on
capital or spread is deﬁned by the following equation:
ˆ k − R̂ ) = ζ (q̂ k + k̄ˆ − n̂ ) + μ̂e + σ̂ ,
Êt (R̃
t
sp,b t
t
t
ω,t
t+1
t

(13)

where σ̂ω,t is deﬁned as a spread shock. It characterizes banks’ perception of the riskiness of entrepreneurs. For example, if this shock
increases, banks perceive entrepreneurs to be risky and, thus, bank
loans are harder to receive. This decrease in funds hampers the ability of entrepreneurs to funnel capital to the intermediate goods sector. ζsp,b characterizes the elasticity of the spread to entrepreneurs’
leverage, which is deﬁned as the ratio of the value of capital to nominal net worth. The amount of installed capital in the model is given
by


i∗ ˆ
i∗
i∗
ˆ
k̄t−1 + μ̂t + ı̂t ,
k̄t = 1 −
(14)
k∗
k∗
k∗
where μ̂t deﬁnes the eﬃciency of new investments toward creating new capital and is labeled the marginal eﬃciency of investment
shock. For instance, if there is a positive increase to this shock,
investments become more productive (i.e., use fewer resources) for
the creation of new capital and, thus, generate more economic activity. The amount of investment ı̂t is deﬁned by
ı̂t =

1
β
1
q̂ k + μ̂t ,
ı̂t−1 +
Êt ı̂t+1 +
1+β
1+β
(1 + β)S  e2γ t

(15)
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where S(•) captures the cost of adjusting capital and S  > 0 and
S  > 0.
The amount of capital is described by the following equation:
k̂t = ût + k̄ˆt−1 .

(16)

ût deﬁnes the capital utilization rate, and the corresponding equation is given by
r∗k r̂tk = a ût ,

(17)

where a captures capital utilization costs.
2.2.1

Monetary Policy

The model’s central bank adjusts the short-term nominal interest
rate using the following monetary policy rule:
R̂t = ψπ π̂t + ψy ŷt +

P
εM
t

+

L


εR
l,t−l ,

(18)

l=1
P
deﬁnes an unanticipated monetary policy shock. Forwhere εM
t
ward guidance is added into the model by augmenting the monetary
policy rule with anticipated shocks similar to Laséen and Svensson (2011), Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012), and Cole
(2015). Each anticipated or forward guidance shock (εR
l,t−l ) is conL R
tained in the term l=1 εl,t−l found in equation (18) and is iid.2
A forward guidance shock deﬁnes a central bank announcement in
period t − l that the interest rate will change l periods later, that
is, in period t. In addition, L represents the length of the central
bank’s time-contingent forward guidance horizon. Thus, there are L
forward guidance shocks in equation (18) that aﬀect the monetary
policy rule in period t. Following Laséen and Svensson (2011) and
Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012), the system is also aug-

2

These shocks are also described as news shocks in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2012). They study the contribution of anticipated shocks to U.S. business cycles.
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mented with L state variables v1,t , v2,t , . . . , vL,t whose laws of motion
are given by
v1,t = v2,t−1 + εR
1,t

(19)

v2,t = v3,t−1 + εR
2,t

(20)

v3,t = v4,t−1 + εR
3,t

(21)

..
.
vL,t = εR
L,t .

(22)

Each term in vt = [v1,t , v2,t , . . . , vL,t ] contains the sum of all forward
guidance statements known to agents in period t that change the
interest rate 1, 2, . . . , and L periods later, respectively.Equations
L
R
(19)–(22) can also be simpliﬁed to ﬁnd that v1,t−1 =
l=1 εl,t−l ,
which is the sum of all forward guidance commitments announced
by the central bank 1, 2, . . . , and L periods ago that aﬀect the interest rate in period t.3 In addition, the main reason to model forward
guidance in this manner regards indeterminacy. If forward guidance
is alternatively modeled as pegging the interest rate to a certain
value, indeterminacy can arise as described in Honkapohja and Mitra
(2005) and Woodford (2005). For instance, without a monetary policy that responds to economic activity, real disturbances to the economy can produce multiple equilibriums.4 However, forward guidance
modeled by equations (19)–(22) can still attain a constant interest
rate path. As will be described in section 4.3, the forward guidance
shocks can be chosen such that the R̂t = R̄ throughout the forward
guidance horizon.
The following example is provided to gain intuition on equations
(19)–(22). Consider the case in which the central bank’s forward
guidance horizon is two periods ahead, i.e., L = 2. The model’s
3

It will be helpful to note that the units of the standard deviations of the
forward guidance shocks are in terms of the interest rate Rt since v1,t−1 equals
L R
l=1 εl,t−l and is found in equation (18).
4
Determinacy can occur from modeling forward guidance as an interest rate
peg as described in Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2015). However, terminal
conditions need to be known, a standard monetary policy rule needs to be followed after the interest rate peg, and exceedingly large responses of output and
inﬂation to forward guidance occur.
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system of equations includes v1,t and v2,t , whose laws of motion are
deﬁned as
R
R
v1,t = v2,t−1 + εR
1,t = ε2,t−1 + ε1,t

(23)

v2,t = εR
2,t .

(24)

The variable v1,t contains all central bank forward guidance known
in period t that aﬀects the interest rate one period later, that is,
R
εR
2,t−1 and ε1,t . Forward guidance known in period t that aﬀects
the interest rate two periods later is deﬁned by v2,t . This variable
consists of εR
2,t , which is deﬁned as current-period forward guidance
that aﬀects the interest rate two periods later. Furthermore, the
“ ˆ ” symbol over the variables is removed for the remainder of the
paper to simplify notation.

2.3

Exogenous Shocks

The model’s exogenous shocks consist of a spread shock (σw,t ), price
markup shock (λf,t ), labor shock (ϕt ), stochastic preference shock
(bt ), government spending shock (gt ), marginal eﬃciency of investment shock (μt ), bankruptcy cost shock (μet ), time-varying exogenous survival rate of entrepreneurs shock (γt ), monetary policy shock
P
R
R
5
), and forward guidance shocks (εR
(εM
t
1,t , ε2,t , . . . , εL,t ). Except for
the unanticipated monetary policy and forward guidance shocks,
the structural shocks follow an AR(1) process with autocorrelation
parameters (ρσw , ρλf , ρϕ , ρb , ρg , ρμ , ρμe , and ργ ).
3.

Expectations Formation

This paper assumes agents evaluate the expectations in equations
(1)–(17) following either the rational expectations hypothesis or
adaptive learning. Rational expectations agents form expectations
based on the true model of the economy. They know the structure of
the model, parameters of the model (e.g., ζp , h, etc.), distribution of
the error terms, and beliefs of other agents. Adaptive learning agents
do not know the true model of the economy. Instead, they operate as
5

The units of the standard deviations of the shocks are in terms of their
respective left-hand-side variables.
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real-life economists (e.g., econometricians) by creating an econometric model of the economy to produce forecasts of future economic
variables. They estimate the parameters using standard econometric
techniques and revise their forecasts as new data arrives.6

3.1

Rational Expectations

The model under rational expectations is solved using standard techniques (e.g., Sims 2002). The model is written in general state-space
form:
 0 Yt = C + Γ
 1 Yt−1 + Γ
 2 εt + Γ
 3 ζt ,
Γ

(25)

where
Yt = [Yt , t , vt , Ξt ]

(26)

Yt = [ξt , Rt , ct , k̄t , it , kt , ut , rtk , qt , R̃tK , πt , nt , wt , w̃t , Lt , mct , yt , mt ]
(27)
t = [λf,t , μt , ϕt , gt , σw,t , bt , μet , γt ]


vt = [v1,t , v2,t , . . . , vL,t ]

(28)
(29)

k
Ξt = [Et ξt+1 , Et πt+1 , Et ct+1 , Et it+1 , Et R̃t+1
, Et w̃t+1 , Et wt+1 ]

(30)
e

g σw b μ
γ MP
R
R 
εt = [ελt , εμt , εϕ
, εR
t , εt , εt , εt , εt , εt , εt
1,t , ε2,t , . . . , εL,t ] .

(31)

C denotes a vector of constants of required dimensions, Yt deﬁnes
a vector containing the model’s endogenous variables, t is a vector of the model’s exogenous processes, and Ξt denotes the vector
of expectations. The iid structural disturbances and forward guidance shocks are contained in the vector εt . The expectational errors
(e.g., ζtπ = πt − Et−1 πt ) are contained in the vector ζt of required
dimensions. When using the technique proposed by Sims (2002) and
the parameter values in table 1 (shown later), the solution under
rational expectations is
 + ξ1 Yt−1 + ξ2 εt ,
Yt = C
6

(32)

For a more in-depth discussion, see Marcet and Sargent (1989), Evans and
Honkapohja (2001), and Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009).
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 ξ1 , and ξ2 are nonlinear functions of the
where the matrices C,
7
model’s parameters.

3.2

Adaptive Learning

Adaptive learning agents evaluate the expectations in equations (1)–
(17) by forming an econometric model and estimating the coeﬃcients. This model is called the “perceived law of motion” (PLM)
and contains the variables that appear in the minimum state variable (MSV) solution that exists under rational expectations.8 The
PLM is given by
Yt = a + bYt−1 + cvt + d˜¯t + ev1,t−1 + εW
t ,

(33)

P 
where ˜¯t = [t , εM
] and εW
t
t is perceived white-noise error. Yt , vt ,
and t are deﬁned as in the rational expectations model. In addition,
the reader should note that vt and ¯t can be expressed as

vt = Φvt−1 + ηt

(34)

˜
¯t = φ˜
¯t−1 + ¯t ,

(35)

where Φ is an L x L matrix given by
⎡

0
0
0
..
.

⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
Φ=⎢
⎢
⎢ 0
⎢ 0
⎢
⎣ 0

7

1
0
0

0
1
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

⎤
0 ... 0 0
0 ... 0 0 ⎥
⎥
1 ... 0 0 ⎥
⎥
.
..
⎥
. ..
⎥
⎥
0 ... 1 0 ⎥
0 ... 0 1 ⎥
⎥
0 ... 0 0 ⎦

(36)

Section 4.1 contains a discussion of the model’s parameter values.
This paper utilizes a PLM that is based on the unique non-explosive rational
expectations equilibrium.
8

Vol. 16 No. 4

The Limits of Central Bank Forward Guidance

217

and
R
R 
ηt = [εR
1,t , ε1,t , . . . , εL,t ]
⎡
ρλf 0
0
0
⎢ 0 ρμ 0
0
⎢
0 ρϕ 0
⎢ 0
⎢
0
0 ρg
⎢ 0
⎢
0
0
0
0
⎢
φ = ⎢
0
0
0
0
⎢
⎢
0
0
0
⎢ 0
⎢ 0
0
0
0
⎢
⎣ 0
0
0
0

(37)
0
0
0
0
ρσw
0
0
0
0
e

0
0
0
0
0
ρb
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
ρμe
0
0

g w b μ
γ MP 
¯t = [ελt , εμt , εϕ
].
t , εt , εt , εt , εt , εt , εt

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
ργ
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

(38)

(39)

a, b, c, d, and e are unknown coeﬃcient matrices of appropriate
dimensions that adaptive learning agents estimate each period. The
time subscript is not added to the PLM coeﬃcients to highlight
that adaptive learning agents believe their expectations to be optimal every period. They do not take into account that they will be
updating their beliefs in the future. However, the coeﬃcients in the
PLM will evolve each period, as will be described later. Furthermore,
the addition of v1,t−1 in the PLM is necessary. v1,t−1 is contained in
the rational expectations solution but not found in the vector vt , as
seen in equations (34) and (36).
This paper assumes the following timeline of events for the learning expectations formation process:
• At the beginning of period t, adaptive learning agents observe
vt and ˜¯t and add these variables to their information set.
• Agents use previous-period’s estimates (i.e., at−1 , bt−1 , ct−1 ,
dt−1 , and et−1 ) and Yt−1 , vt , ˜
¯t , and v1,t−1 to construct forecasts of future endogenous variables.
• The values of the endogenous variables contained in Yt are
realized.
• Adaptive learning agents update their parameter estimates by
computing a least-squares regression of Yt on 1, Yt−1 , vt , ˜¯t ,
and v1,t−1 .
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Agents update their parameter estimates of the PLM by following the recursive least squares (RLS) formula
φt = φt−1 + τt Rt−1 zt (Yt − φt−1 zt )
Rt = Rt−1 +

τt (zt zt

− Rt−1 ),

(40)
(41)

where φ = (a, b, c, d, e) contains the PLM coeﬃcients to be esti¯t , v1,t−1 ] deﬁnes the regressors in the
mated and zt ≡ [1, Yt−1 , vt , ˜
PLM. Rt is the precision matrix of the regressors in the PLM. Adaptive learning agents’ recent prediction error is given by the last
expression in (40). The “gain” parameter τt governs the degree in
which φt responds to new information.
This current paper examines the discounted or constant gain
learning (CGL) case in which the gain parameter is ﬁxed to a certain
value, that is, τt = τ̄ . As described in Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
the coeﬃcients will converge in distribution to their rational expectations counterparts with a variance proportional to τt = τ̄ . Under
this scheme, recent observations also play a larger role when adaptive learning agents are updating their coeﬃcients. This assumption
allows agents to update their beliefs every period to new information
(e.g., forward guidance), as is similar to real-life economists updating
their forecasts as new data arrive.9
Adaptive learning agents solve for Êt Yt+1 by using equation (33).
Speciﬁcally, expectations are given by
Êt Yt+1 = (I18 + bt−1 )at−1 + b2t−1 Yt−1 + (bt−1 ct−1 + ct−1 Φ)vt
 ˜¯t + bt−1 et−1 v1,t−1 + et−1 v1,t .
+ (bt−1 dt−1 + dt−1 φ)

(42)

Equation (42) is substituted into equations (1)–(17) to give the
“actual law of motion” (ALM):
Yt = Γ0 (φt−1 ) + Γ1 (φt−1 )Yt−1 + Γ2 (φt−1 )vt + Γ3 (φt−1 )vt−1
˜t−1 .
+ Γ4 (φt−1 )¯˜t + Γ5 (φt−1 )¯
(43)
9
This approach is in contrast to the decreasing gain or RLS case in which
τt = t−1 . If the E-stability condition is satisﬁed and a projection facility is used,
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) describe that RLS implies past observations are
equally weighted and the coeﬃcients converge to their rational expectations
counterparts with probability one as t → ∞.
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The previous equation describes the evolution of the model’s endogenous variables implied by the PLM in (33).
The approach employed in this paper to model expectations
under adaptive learning is the “Euler equation” (EE) method, which
is in contrast to the inﬁnite-horizon approach (IH). The former is the
most common approach used in the literature in which one-periodahead expectations show up in the model’s equilibrium equations.
Another approach is IH learning, discussed in Preston (2005). The
values of current-period macroeconomic variables (e.g., output and
inﬂation) depend on the inﬁnite-horizon expectations of the endogenous variables. It is apparent that the outcomes to forward guidance
of these two approaches might vary as the future stream of interest
rates are modeled in the IH approach.10 However, if agents know
or quickly learn the market clearing conditions, Honkapohja, Mitra,
and Evans (2013) show that the two approaches to learning are valid
and model consistent. The stability of the adaptive learning model is
also typically not aﬀected by implementing either EE or IH learning
as described by Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009).11
EE learning is employed in this paper over IH learning for the following reasons. The purpose of this paper is to examine the eﬀects of
forward guidance when the standard assumptions of rational expectations and frictionless ﬁnancial markets are relaxed. Thus, by utilizing a standard ﬁnancial friction model with rational expectations
(i.e., FRBNY DSGE), both assumptions can easily be relaxed to
investigate the eﬀects of forward guidance. In addition, EE learning
is more straightforward and tractable than IH learning to implement in larger models, such as the FRBNY DSGE model employed
in the present paper.12 Therefore, while inﬁnite-horizon learning in
a ﬁnancial friction model would be interesting to explore in a future

10

The future stream of interest rates could add another channel through which
forward guidance could operate. However, as will be detailed below, the purpose
of the paper is to investigate the eﬀects of forward guidance when relaxing the
benchmark assumptions of frictionless ﬁnancial markets and rational expectations
in a standard DSGE ﬁnancial friction model.
11
Another part of the adaptive learning literature examines “ﬁnite-horizon
learning” (Branch, Evans, and McGough 2013, p. 143). This area examines
adaptive learning under expectations that are in the middle of EE and IH.
12
However, IH learning is relatively simple to apply in smaller models (e.g., the
New Keynesian model presented in Woodford 2003).
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study, this approach to modeling adaptive learning expectations is
beyond the scope of the paper.
4.

4.1

Results

Parameterization

Table 1 displays the values of the parameters used in simulation. The
values largely follow from empirical work by Del Negro, Giannoni,
and Patterson (2012) and Del Negro et al. (2013). There exists a high
degree of habit formation in consumption with h = 0.71. a = 0.2
indicates a smaller reaction of the rental rate of capital to changes
in the capital utilization rate. The value of the price stickiness parameter implies that prices change once a year, which also corresponds
to empirical work by Klenow and Malin (2010). The inclusion of a
ﬁnancial sector also adds additional credit market parameters. The
survival rate of entrepreneurs is set to 0.99. ζsp,b deﬁnes the elasticity
K
− Rt )) with respect to leverage (qtk + k̄t − nt )
of the spread (Et (R̃t+1
and equals 0.05. For simplicity, the structural shocks are assumed
to be iid. The distribution of the noise shocks is not assumed to be
highly dispersed. There also is no covariance between the structural
shocks.
The CGL parameter, τ̄ , is chosen to be 0.02 for the following two
reasons. This value closely follows Orphanides and Williams (2005),
Branch and Evans (2006), and Milani (2007). The value of τ̄ = 0.02
is also justiﬁed by following the procedure of Eusepi and Preston
(2011) and Sinha (2016). Speciﬁcally, the autocorrelations of the
forecast error of the interest rate across the benchmark, lower, and
higher values of the constant gain learning parameter are compared
with their counterparts in the data.13 The data regard the forecast
error of the one-quarter-ahead three-month Treasury bill rate from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia. The time period spans 1981:Q3 to 2016:Q2.
Table 2 displays the results, which show that the adaptive learning
model with a gain of τ̄ = 0.02 is closest to the data in terms of
autocorrelation of the forecast error for the interest rate.
13

The lower and higher values of τ̄ are 0.001 and 0.03, respectively. These values
follow from section 4.5.
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Table 1. Parameter Values

α
ζp
ιp
δ
Φ
S 
h
a
υl
υm
β
ζw
ιw
λw
ψπ
ψy
ζspb
γ
λf
g∗
F (ω̄)
L
τ̄

Description

Value

Capital’s Share of Output
Price Stickiness
Price Indexation
Depreciation
Share of Fixed Costs
Investment Adjustment Cost
Habit Formation
Capital Utilization Cost
Elasticity of Labor Supply
Money Demand
Discount Factor
Wage Stickiness
Wage Indexation
Elast. of Sub. Diﬀ. Labor Services
Feedback Inﬂation
Feedback Output
Elast. of Spread w.r.t. Leverage
Steady-State Growth Rate of Economy
Steady-State Price Markup
Steady-State Government
Steady-State Default Rate
FG Horizon
CGL

0.33
0.75
0.54
0.025
0.3
4
0.71
0.2
2
2
0.99
0.75
0.5
0.3
1.40
0.10
0.05
2.75
0.15
0.3
0.03
12
0.02

Notes: The standard deviations of the structural shocks are set to 0.0001. FG stands
for forward guidance. The autoregressive parameters for the structural shocks are set
to equal 0.

Table 2. Autocorrelation in Forecast Errors of the
Nominal Interest Rate
SPF

CGL
w/τ̄ = 0.001

CGL
w/τ̄ = 0.02

CGL
w/τ̄ = 0.03

0.11

0.18

0.13

0.20

Notes: This table presents the autocorrelation in forecast error of the nominal interest rate computed as the diﬀerence between Rt and Et−1 Rt . SPF stands for Survey
of Professional Forecasters. CGL means constant gain learning. Data for SPF span
from 1981:Q3 to 2016:Q2.
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The values of the monetary policy parameters in table 1 closely
match the existing literature. Monetary policy positively responds to
output and positively adjusts at more than a one-to-one rate to inﬂation. The value of χx closely follows Gilchrist, Ortiz, and Zakrajšek
(2009), who estimated a medium-scale DSGE model with ﬁnancial
frictions. The value of the inﬂation feedback parameter (i.e., χπ )
closely follows empirical adaptive learning work by Milani (2007).
In addition, L represents the length of central bank time-contingent
forward guidance and is set equal to 12. This number is based on
the FOMC September 2012 statement, which was one of its last
announcements to exclusively use time-contingent forward guidance
language. In this statement, the FOMC said “the Committee also
decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate
at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that exceptionally low
levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least
through mid-2015.” The number of quarters from September 2012
to “mid-2015” is 12 when taking “mid-2015” to be, at most, the end
of the third quarter of 2015.

4.2

Normal Economic Times

I ﬁrst examine the diﬀerences between rational expectations and
adaptive learning to forward guidance under the DSGE model
with ﬁnancial frictions. K-period impulse responses of output,
investment, and inﬂation to negative-one-standard-deviation forward guidance shocks under diﬀerent expectations assumptions are
examined in ﬁgures 1 and 2.14 In addition, adaptive learning impulse
response functions cannot be computed using standard linear techniques, as equation (43) exhibits a nonlinear structure. Thus, the
following approach from Eusepi and Preston (2011) is utilized. The
model is simulated twice for T + 1 + K periods, where K is the
impulse response horizon and is chosen to be 20 periods.15 One
14

The forward guidance shocks are found in equations (19)–(22).
To ensure that the adaptive learning coeﬃcients converge to its stationary
distribution, T is chosen to be a large number. In this paper, T = 5, 000. This
also eliminates the eﬀect of initial conditions. In addition, the initial beliefs for
φ are set to their rational expectations counterparts and for R are set to the
identity matrix.
15
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simulation contains a negative-one-standard-deviation forward guidance shock in period T + 1. The impulse responses are given by
the diﬀerence between the two simulations over the ﬁnal K = 20
periods. Besides the addition of a negative-one-standard-deviation
shock in time period T + 1 in the ﬁrst simulation, the shocks are the
same in both simulations across the T + 1 + K time period and are
drawn from a normal distribution with standard deviations reported
in section 4.1. This process is repeated a large number of times and
the average is taken to arrive at the reported impulse response function. Furthermore, the solid lines in ﬁgures 1, 2, 3, and 4 represent
rational expectations impulse response functions. The dashed lines
denote the adaptive learning impulse response functions with 95
percent conﬁdence bands given by the dotted lines.16
Figures 1 and 2 show that the macroeconomic variables overall display a stronger reaction to forward guidance under rational
expectations than under adaptive learning.17 Even though forward
guidance has stimulative eﬀects on both expectations assumptions,
the adaptive learning output path exhibits a smaller reaction to forward guidance shocks than rational expectations. Rational expectations agents’ forecasts are based on the true model of the economy.
Consequently, rational expectations agents understand the eﬀects
that statements about the future interest rate have on future macroeconomic variables. However, adaptive learning agents are unable to
base their expectations on the true model of the economy, as they are
not endowed with that knowledge. Instead, they estimate the eﬀects
of forward guidance utilizing an econometric model of the economy.

16

As described by Branch, Evans, and McGough (2014), CGL models can also
exhibit explosive dynamics, especially with lagged variables in adaptive learning
agents’ forecasting equation. Thus, by following the CGL literature, this paper
implements a projection facility. Speciﬁcally, if the eigenvalues on the b matrix in
equation (33) have modulus greater than or equal to one, agents are assumed to
stop updating. The parameter estimates for φ are returned back to the rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) and the R matrix to its initial value, that is,
the identity matrix. Moreover, as stated by Branch, Evans, and McGough (2014,
p. 2), projection facilities can be interpreted as agents discarding “data that do
not align with their prior belief that the economic system is stable.”
17
Overall, the eﬀects of forward guidance in this model are also symmetric,
that is, the case of a one-standard-deviation forward guidance shock increase.
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Figure 1. Impulse Responses of Macroeconomic Variables
to Forward Guidance Shocks
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Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95
percent conﬁdence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive
learning impulse responses are given by the diﬀerence between the shocked and
unshocked simulations.

Adaptive learning agents are continually adjusting their forecasts
each period, causing a smaller reaction to forward guidance.18
Figures 3 and 4 show the reaction of ﬁnancial variables to forward guidance statements under both expectations formations. The
impulse responses of net worth to (negative) 1-, 4-, 8-, and 12-periodahead forward guidance shocks display a stronger reaction under
rational expectations than under adaptive learning. The response
18
It is important to note that adaptive learning agents’ responses could be
exactly the same as their rational expectations counterparts, as the former agents
use the MSV solution of a linearized model when constructing forecasts. This
situation arises if the former agents had REE-consistent beliefs. Therefore, the
discrepancy in results between the two expectations formation processes is due
to adaptive learning forecasts diverging from REE as a consequence of adaptive
learning adjustment process.
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses of Macroeconomic Variables
to Forward Guidance Shocks
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Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95
percent conﬁdence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive
learning impulse responses are given by the diﬀerence between the shocked and
unshocked simulations.

of the spread displays intuition for this result. For instance, the
response of the spread to one- and four-period-ahead forward guidance shocks is more favorable under rational expectations than under
adaptive learning. This beneﬁcial change in the spread causes a
larger increase in net worth under rational expectations than adaptive learning.19 The reasoning is the same as the previous paragraph:
rational expectations agents base their forecasts on the true model
of the economy, while adaptive learning agents do not.

19
The spread for the 8- and 12-period-ahead shocks are closer together for both
rational expectations and adaptive learning. However, the responses of net worth
are still less than rational expectations for both of the shocks.
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Figure 3. Impulse Responses of Financial Variables to
Forward Guidance Shocks
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Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95
percent conﬁdence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive
learning impulse responses are given by the diﬀerence between the shocked and
unshocked simulations.

The inclusion of a ﬁnancial sector contributes to the diﬀerences
between adaptive learning and rational expectations. Under the latter expectations formation scheme, a forward guidance announcement has the following eﬀects. First, rational expectations agents
know precisely how the opportunity cost of future consumption
decreases with lower future interest rates. They lower future savings for more future consumption. Since agents are forward looking,
current consumption (and thus, output as seen by ﬁgure 1) increases
with a decrease in current savings. Rational expectations agents
also know precisely how forward guidance statements to drop future
interest rates will aﬀect future expected cost of borrowing by entrepreneurs from the ﬁnancial sector. Since a commitment to decrease
future interest rates lowers the expected cost of borrowing, a favorable forward guidance statement entices entrepreneurs to take out
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Figure 4. Impulse Responses of Financial Variables to
Forward Guidance Shocks
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Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95
percent conﬁdence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive
learning impulse responses are given by the diﬀerence between the shocked and
unshocked simulations.

more loans to purchase capital. Investment then increases by capital
producers to produce more capital for entrepreneurs. The latter funnel more capital to the intermediate goods sector, increasing overall
economic activity. However, adaptive learning agents do not precisely understand how forward guidance aﬀects future consumption,
savings, and expected cost of borrowing, as they base their expectations on an econometric model of the economy. Current consumption
(and thus, savings) and investment are not as responsive under adaptive learning as they are under rational expectations, as evidenced
by ﬁgures 1 and 2.20
20
Moreover, as will formally be explained in section 4.4, ﬁnancial frictions create a larger “wedge” between the responses of rational expectations and adaptive
learning to forward guidance.
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Figure 5. Impulse Responses of Expected Inﬂation to
Forward Guidance Shocks
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It is also useful to examine the response of inﬂation expectations to forward guidance shocks. Figure 5 displays the response
of inﬂation expectations to 1-, 4-, 8-, and 12-period-ahead forward
guidance shocks. Under both expectations formation schemes, an
announcement to lower future interest rates implies agents expecting future increases in demand. Future demand increasing implies
more inﬂation in the future. However, both types of agents do not
expect the same amount of future inﬂation, as they form expectations diﬀerently. Overall, there is a stronger reaction between the
announcement and realization of the shock under rational expectations than under adaptive learning, as the dashed line is below
the solid line. Afterwards, there is a slower adjustment of the adaptive learning path toward rational expectations. Thus, the results
show that the stronger reaction of rational expectations to forward
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Figure 6. Impulse Responses of Macroeconomic Variables
to a Monetary Policy Shock
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percent conﬁdence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive
learning impulse responses are given by the diﬀerence between the shocked and
unshocked simulations.

guidance announcements is in part due to the response of inﬂation
expectations.
The impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a favorable monetary policy shock are shown in ﬁgures 6 and 7. These
graphs display the impulse responses to a negative-one-standardP
. Overall, the adaptive learning responses
deviation shock to εM
t
are not as favorable relative to rational expectations, which is similar
to the case of forward guidance shocks.21 For instance, the path of
21
In addition, persistence is not as great as compared to Rychalovska (2013),
who estimated a DSGE model with ﬁnancial frictions under adaptive learning and
rational expectations but without forward guidance. However, this discrepancy
may be due to Rychalovska (2013) using a PLM with more lags (i.e., AR(2) +
constant) than the one presented in this paper (i.e., equation (33)), which could
induce greater amounts of persistence in expectations formation and, thus, the
macroeconomic variables.
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Figure 7. Impulse Responses of Financial Variables to a
Monetary Policy Shock
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output under adaptive learning is below its rational expectations
counterpart. The logic for the monetary policy shock result is
the same as the forward guidance shock case. Adaptive learning
responses are not as great as responses under rational expectations
because the former type of agents form expectations based on an
econometric model of the economy and the addition of ﬁnancial
frictions.
It is also helpful to understand the ﬁltering problem of both
types of agents. At the time of the announcement of the forward
guidance shock, both agents know the forward guidance shock and
understand the magnitude of it. However, adaptive learning agents
attribute their forecast error partly to permanent and temporary
changes in their coeﬃcients. This fraction depends on the constant
gain parameter τ̄ . This result is similar to the case of a standard unanticipated monetary policy shock. However, the ﬁltering

Vol. 16 No. 4

The Limits of Central Bank Forward Guidance

231

problem of a forward guidance shock and monetary policy shock
diﬀer in that a forward guidance shock directly aﬀects agents’ expectations and has yet to be realized on the economy. Thus, adaptive learning agents are slower than rational expectations agents
to understand the full eﬀects of the forward guidance shock, as
they form expectations utilizing an econometric model. As seen in
ﬁgures 1 and 2, their estimations of the eﬀects of forward guidance
are less relative to rational expectations.
Overall, the message from this section is that rational expectations exhibits a stronger reaction to forward guidance and a ﬁnancial sector compounds the diﬀerences between the two types of
agents. When the central bank communicates forward guidance to
agents, the adaptive learning path of output is diﬀerent than rational
expectations. Rational expectations agents precisely understand the
eﬀects forward guidance has on macroeconomic variables, as they
base their beliefs on the true model of the economy. However, the
expectations of adaptive learning agents are slower to adjust to forward guidance statements, as they base their forecasts on an estimated model of the economy. The presence of ﬁnancial frictions
also creates bigger diﬀerences between rational expectations and
adaptive learning to forward guidance news.

4.3

Economic Crisis

Central bank forward guidance was implemented in response to
the 2007–09 ﬁnancial crisis. With that event in mind, this section
examines the eﬀects of forward guidance during a period of economic crisis (e.g., a recession) under both rational expectations
and adaptive learning assumptions. Speciﬁcally, the central bank
communicates forward guidance information such that the interest
rate R̄ = 0 throughout the recession and forward guidance horizon.
The policy simulation is described next and is motivated by similar
exercises in Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) and Cole
(2015).
The model is ﬁrst simulated until period T + 1 with the
shocks drawn from the same normal distribution as in section 4.2.
This time frame reﬂects a period of economic stability (e.g., the
period before the Great Recession). In period T + 1, the economy
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experiences a recession that lasts six periods.22 A large negative
spread shock aﬀects the model in period T +1, followed by a sequence
of ﬁve more adverse spread shocks.23 To counter the adverse eﬀects
in the economy, the central bank implements forward guidance. It
communicates to the public that the interest rate will equal R̄ = 0
in period T + 1 and L periods into the future. This forward guidance
announcement corresponds to an unanticipated change in the interest rate in period T +1 and anticipated changes in the interest rate in
periods T +2 through T +L+1. Speciﬁcally, the central bank chooses
P
the unanticipated monetary policy shock, εM
T +1 , and the anticiR
R
pated forward guidance shocks ηT +1 = [εR
1,T +1 , ε2,T +1 , . . . , εL,T +1 ]
such that the nominal interest rate equals 0 from the time period
T + 1 through T + L + 1.24 In addition, the length of the central
bank’s forward guidance spans a recession and normal times since
L = 12. If agents expect the interest rate to be lower than usual
even during economic expansions, that is, normal times, forward
guidance can have additional stimulative eﬀects. The central bank
also assumes that agents form their expectations via the rational
expectations hypothesis. This expectations formation scheme is the
standard assumption in macroeconomic models. The same forward
guidance is then given to adaptive learning agents in order to examine the diﬀerences between the two types of expectations formation
assumptions.
The previously described exercise assumes that the central bank
is committed to keeping the interest rate at zero throughout the
forward guidance horizon. Rational expectations agents precisely
understand how the central bank’s forward guidance statements
aﬀect the economy. Thus, the interest rate equals R̄ = 0 throughout
the forward guidance horizon. However, adaptive learning agents

22
The recession’s length is chosen in accordance with the National Bureau of
Economic Research’s deﬁnition of the 2007–09 Great Recession.
23
After the recession, the shocks are drawn from a normal distribution.
24
The shocks across the T + L + 1 horizon are drawn from the same normal
distribution as in section 4.2 with the exception of the chosen unanticipated
monetary policy and forward guidance shocks in period T + 1 and the additional
adverse spread shocks in periods T + 1 through T + 6. After the forward guidance
shocks are chosen in period T + 1, they are not drawn in the remaining periods.
In addition, T = 5, 000, as in section 4.2.
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have an incomplete model of the economy when forming expectations. By giving adaptive learning agents the same forward guidance information that was given to rational expectations agents, the
interest rate will not achieve a model-implied R̄ = 0 throughout
the forward guidance horizon. To model the central bank promising to keep R̄ = 0 over the forward guidance horizon and ensure
the interest rate is the same value in both rational expectations and
adaptive learning, this policy exercise follows Cole (2015) such that
P
the central bank chooses εM
each period to guarantee that R̄ = 0.
t
The spread shock operates through the ﬁnancial sector to cause
a downturn in the economy. A higher spread implies that banks perceive entrepreneurs to be riskier and, thus, borrowing costs and cost
of capital for ﬁrms increase. This result hinders ﬁrms from receiving capital from entrepreneurs. Lower economic activity results from
less capital being channeled to the production side of the economy.
Furthermore, the modeling of a recession via a spread shock closely
matches the data. Del Negro et al. (2013) show that spread shocks
accounted for about half the decline in output growth during the
Great Recession in the United States.
Figure 8 displays the macroeconomic eﬀects of forward guidance
during an economic recession. The diﬀerence between rational expectations and adaptive learning of diﬀerent macroeconomic variables
is plotted. A positive value indicates that the macroeconomic variable’s value is higher under rational expectations than under adaptive learning. If the value is negative, the value of the macroeconomic
variable is lower under rational expectations than under adaptive
learning. The ﬁgure shows that the stimulative economic eﬀects of
forward guidance are larger under rational expectations than under
adaptive learning. Speciﬁcally, the value of output in the top panel
of ﬁgure 8 is higher under rational expectations than under adaptive
learning across the entire forward guidance horizon.
What accounts for the higher response of output to forward
guidance under rational expectations than under adaptive learning?
The ﬁrst source comes from the ﬁnancial sector of the model. In
the bottom three panels of ﬁgure 8, diﬀerences occur between the
responses of rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward
guidance. However, the disparity is greater under investment than
consumption and inﬂation, indicating that ﬁnancial elements are
driving the disparity in output between rational expectations and
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Figure 8. Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Forward Guidance
during an Economic Crisis
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Notes: The graphs show the diﬀerence in the paths of the macroeconomic variables between rational expectations and adaptive learning agents. This exercise
occurs under both negative spread shocks and when the central bank communicates forward guidance such that the interest rate R̄ = 0 throughout the recession
and forward guidance horizon. A positive value indicates that the value under
rational expectations is higher than under adaptive learning. A negative value
indicates that the variable’s value under rational expectations is lower than under
adaptive learning.

adaptive learning. The diﬀerences between the amount of the knowledge rational expectations and adaptive learning agents have about
the economy also inﬂuence the results seen in ﬁgure 8. Since they
construct forecasts using the true model of the economy, rational
expectations agents precisely understand how central bank forward
guidance will stimulate the economy. However, adaptive learning
agents do not know the true model of the economy when constructing their expectations. Since they use an econometric model to build
their forecasts, adaptive learning agents estimate the eﬀects of forward guidance on the economy. Thus, they fail to understand all of
the positive beneﬁts of forward guidance.
The results in this section also relate to the “forward guidance puzzle” found in Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012).
Their paper showed that central bank forward guidance produced
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an exceedingly large reaction of the macroeconomic variables in relation to the data. Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) also
solved expectations via the rational expectations hypothesis. In addition, the model in this present paper is based on the model in Del
Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012), but is solved under both
the assumptions of rational expectations and adaptive learning. As
shown in the top panel of ﬁgure 8, the value of output exhibits a
much larger and more favorable reaction to forward guidance under
rational expectations than under adaptive learning. Thus, this paper
suggests that the extreme responses of the macroeconomic variables
to forward guidance found in Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson
(2012) could be due to the expectations assumption.
Overall, the eﬀect of forward guidance is larger when agents form
beliefs via the rational expectations hypothesis rather than under
adaptive learning. Since they construct forecasts of future endogenous variables using the true model of the economy, rational expectations agents precisely understand the positive eﬀects of forward
guidance. However, adaptive learning agents have partial knowledge
about the true model of the economy and must estimate the eﬀects
of forward guidance using an econometric model. In addition, ﬁnancial factors play an important role in explaining the more favorable
response of output to forward guidance under rational expectations
than under adaptive learning. Speciﬁcally, the diﬀerences in investment between rational expectations and adaptive learning drive the
disparity in output. The results of adaptive learning to forward guidance also seem to match the data better than those of rational
expectations.

4.4

Importance of Financial Frictions

While the previous section commented on the importance of credit
frictions, this current section investigates in depth how the addition of ﬁnancial frictions to a standard DSGE model aﬀects the
diﬀerences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to
forward guidance statements. This examination is important for two
reasons. Financial frictions play an integral part of an economy. Del
Negro et al. (2013) show that spread shocks emanating from the
ﬁnancial sector contributed to about half the decrease in U.S. output during the 2007–09 ﬁnancial crisis. In addition, the inclusion of
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Figure 9. Diﬀerence between Impulse Response Functions
of Rational Expectations and Adaptive Learning to
Forward Guidance Shocks under Diﬀerent Values of ζspb
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a ﬁnancial component in modern macroeconomic models is not standard practice. This exclusion may leave out an important channel
through which forward guidance operates.
The impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to forward
guidance shocks across rational expectations and adaptive learning
assumptions are computed under diﬀerent values of ζspb . This parameter deﬁnes the elasticity of the spread with respect to leverage
of entrepreneurs and governs the strength of the ﬁnancial sector’s
inﬂuence on the economy. When ζspb decreases, the inﬂuence of
entrepreneurs’ leverage (i.e., the ratio of the value of capital to net
worth) on the economy diminishes, that is, the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
conditions on the economy decrease. Therefore, the results of section
4.2 are examined under the baseline case of ζspb = 0.05 as well as
ζspb = 0.001 to show the contribution of the ﬁnancial sector to the
diﬀerences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to
forward guidance.
Figures 9 and 10 show that the addition of a ﬁnancial sector into
a standard New Keynesian model ampliﬁes the disparity between
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Figure 10. Diﬀerence between Impulse Response
Functions of Rational Expectations and Adaptive
Learning to Forward Guidance Shocks under Diﬀerent
Values of ζspb
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rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance.
The top rows in the ﬁgures display the diﬀerence in output between
the two expectations formation schemes to forward guidance shocks
under diﬀerent values of ζspb . When the eﬀect of ﬁnancial conditions on the economy diminishes, that is, ζspb = 0.001, the diﬀerences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance reduce. However, when ﬁnancial factors are allowed
to exist, that is, ζspb = 0.05, the disparity between the two increases.
As ﬁnancial conditions play a bigger role in the economy, a bigger “wedge” exists between the output responses of rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance. The adaptive
learning agents must estimate how forward guidance will alleviate the recession by forecasting not only future variables concerning households and ﬁrms but also the ﬁnancial sector. This creates
more errors by the adaptive learning agents relative to their rational
expectations counterparts, causing the eﬀects of forward guidance to
be larger under rational expectations relative to adaptive learning.
Thus, the removal of ﬁnancial frictions from standard DSGE models leaves out an important channel through which forward guidance
operates.

238

International Journal of Central Banking

September 2020

The impulse responses of investment in the bottom rows of
ﬁgures 9 and 10 also show how the addition of a ﬁnancial sector can
exacerbate the diﬀerences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance statements. The same type of large
wedge that exists between rational expectations and adaptive learning under output is apparent under investment. When credit frictions
play a larger role in the economy (e.g., ζspb = 0.05), adaptive learning agents’ forecasting model is more inﬂuenced by the ﬁnancial
sector. Thus, bigger diﬀerences between rational expectations and
adaptive learning exist.
Overall, the ﬁndings in this section suggest a key takeaway for
policymakers. If monetary policymakers want to understand the
eﬀects of forward guidance and utilize macroeconomic models with
the standard assumptions of rational expectations and frictionless
ﬁnancial markets, the results may be potentially misleading. This
section shows that the addition of ﬁnancial frictions into a standard macroeconomic model exacerbates the diﬀerences between the
responses of rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward
guidance.

4.5

Alternative Constant Gains

This section examines the importance of ﬁnancial frictions for forward guidance eﬀectiveness when the degree in which adaptive learning agents discount previous observations is changed. Speciﬁcally,
the ﬁnancial friction “wedge” that exists between the responses of
rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance is
examined to see how sensitive it is to diﬀerent values of τ̄ . The exercise in section 4.2 is rerun under the baseline value of ζspb = 0.05.
Lower and higher values of τ̄ are also chosen. To capture adaptive
learning agents placing less weight on new information, the results
are examined under τ̄ = 0.001, represented by the dotted line in
ﬁgure 11. To capture adaptive learning agents placing more weight
on new information, the results are examined under τ̄ = 0.03, represented by the dashed line. The benchmark rational expectations
impulse response functions are also displayed and denoted by the
solid line in ﬁgure 11.
Figure 11 shows that the degree in which ﬁnancial frictions
amplify the diﬀerences between rational expectations and adaptive
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Figure 11. Impulse Response Functions to Forward
Guidance Shocks under Diﬀerent Values of τ̄
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Dashed line: CGL with τ̄ = 0.03. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive learning impulse responses are given by the diﬀerence between the shocked
and unshocked simulations.

learning depends on the value of τ̄ . When adaptive learning agents
place more weight on previous observations, that is, as τ̄ increases,
ﬁnancial conditions in the economy have a bigger impact on their
forecasts. Thus, output does not exhibit as strong a response to forward guidance as under a lower value of τ̄ . Figure 11 shows a larger
wedge between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance under τ̄ = 0.03 than τ̄ = 0.001 from the time of the
announcement of the forward guidance shock to its realization. As
adaptive learning agents weight previous observations less, that is,
as τ̄ decreases, their beliefs and forecasts should not vary as much
from the previous period. Consequently, current ﬁnancial conditions
in the economy do not play as big a role in their forecasts. Thus, the
ﬁnancial friction wedge between rational expectations and adaptive
learning diminishes. Figure 11 shows the smaller diﬀerence between
rational expectations and CGL with τ̄ = 0.001 from the time of the
announcement of the forward guidance shock to its realization.
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Figure 12. Impulse Responses of Macroeconomic
Variables to a Spread Shock
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percent conﬁdence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive
learning impulse responses are given by the diﬀerence between the shocked and
unshocked simulations.

4.6

Spread Shock

Section 4.4 investigated how the addition of a ﬁnancial sector to
a standard DSGE model aﬀected the diﬀerences between rational
expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance announcements. However, it is also useful to explore the signiﬁcance of introducing ﬁnancial frictions by examining the eﬀects of a spread shock
on the macroeconomic variables. Speciﬁcally, the current section
will examine the results of impulse responses of the macroeconomic
variables to a (favorable) shock to σw,t .
The results are displayed in ﬁgures 12 and 13. These outcomes are
best seen when analyzing the variables’ responses to a negative-oneunit spread shock. When an unanticipated lowering of σw,t occurs,
both agents recognize the positive eﬀects occurring on the economy. Under both rational expectations and adaptive learning, lower
spreads lead to higher net worth, investment, and output. However,
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Figure 13. Impulse Responses of Financial Variables to a
Spread Shock
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Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95
percent conﬁdence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive
learning impulse responses are given by the diﬀerence between the shocked and
unshocked simulations.

ﬁgures 12 and 13 display an ampliﬁed response of these variables
under adaptive learning. This ampliﬁcation relates to Rychalovska
(2013), who found that in a DSGE model with ﬁnancial frictions
there is a stronger immediate reaction of the macroeconomic variables under adaptive learning than rational expectations. However, the adaptive learning impulse responses in Rychalovska (2013)
exhibit more persistence than those in ﬁgures 12 and 13 in the
current paper. This outcome could be due to the following reason.
Rychalovska (2013) utilizes a more persistent adaptive learning forecasting model (i.e., AR(2) + constant) than the PLM utilized in
the present paper (i.e., equation (33)), which could cause greater
persistence in the macroeconomic variables.

4.7

Contribution of Monetary Policy Shocks

Section 4.3 showed that the eﬀects of forward guidance are larger
under rational expectations relative to adaptive learning during a
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recession. In the exercise of that section, the central bank chose the
forward guidance shocks such that R̄ = 0 across the forward guidance horizon. The same shocks chosen under rational expectations
were given to adaptive learning agents in order to analyze the differences between the two expectations formation schemes. However,
these forward guidance shocks are not suﬃcient to keep the interest
rate at zero under adaptive learning, as the two expectations formation processes are diﬀerent. To remedy this situation, the central
bank was also assumed to be committed to a constant interest rate,
P
and thus chose εM
in the adaptive learning case such that the intert
est rate was zero across the forward guidance horizon. However, a
natural issue arises regarding the contribution of this shock toward
the larger diﬀerences between rational expectations and adaptive
learning exhibited during a recession relative to normal times.
Figures 6, 7, 12, and 13 show that the results are not driven by
non-forward-guidance shocks. The panels in ﬁgures 6 and 7 display
the impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a negativeone-standard-deviation monetary policy shock. The results do not
exhibit notably larger responses relative to the baseline impulse
responses of the variables to forward guidance shocks. In addition,
ﬁgures 12 and 13 display the impulse responses to a spread shock.
Overall, the diﬀerences between the two expectations formation
schemes are not notably large.25
What then could be driving the larger discrepancy between
rational expectations and adaptive learning under a recession relative to normal times? The answer concerns the sizes of the anticipated/forward guidance shocks in section 4.3 that were chosen in
time period T + 1 such that the interest rate equals 0 from the
time period T + 1 through T + L + 1 (i.e., ηT +1 ). Recall that
the impulse responses under normal times involved a negative-onestandard-deviation forward guidance shock in period T + 1. However, under the recession scenario, the sizes of the chosen forward
guidance shocks in period T + 1 (i.e., ηT +1 ) are larger in absolute
value terms than their standard deviations, leading to greater diﬀerences between rational expectations and adaptive learning relative

25

Recall that these impulse responses display a negative-one-unit spread shock,
as stated in section 4.6.
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to normal times. It is not uncommon in the literature for these chosen anticipated/forward guidance shocks to be relatively large (see
Galı́ 2009). Greater discrepancies between rational expectations and
adaptive learning would also occur during normal economic times
under larger forward guidance shocks. Figure 14 displays this reasoning. Each impulse response path is simulated using the same
shocks as described in the ﬁrst paragraph of section 4.2. However,
the diﬀerence between the lines regards the size of the shock in period
T + 1. The solid line contains a −1-standard-deviation forward guidance shock (i.e., the benchmark case of section 4.2), the dotted line a
−10-standard-deviation forward guidance shock, and the dashed line
a −20-standard-deviation forward guidance shock. As the value of
the forward guidance shock increases, the results show that the disparity between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance statements enlarges during normal times.26 Moreover,
the disproportionate response of adaptive learning responses to
larger shock sizes is not uncommon for nonlinear models. For example, Weise (1999) shows disproportionate responses of output to
larger monetary policy shocks in a nonlinear VAR. Koop, Pesaran,
and Potter (1996) and Potter (2000) also describe how the impulse
responses of nonlinear models depend on the magnitude of the
shocks.
It is also important to clarify the initial T time periods under
both normal economic times and economic crisis times. Under both
types of scenarios, the shocks were drawn from the same normal distributions with standard deviations stated in section 4.1. Table 3 also
shows the similarities in the initial time periods across both normal
economic times and economic crisis times. This table describes how
far (or close) the adaptive learning beliefs are from REE at the end
of period T . For instance, the ﬁrst row shows the matrix norm of the
diﬀerence between the adaptive learning matrix aT found in equation (33) and its REE counterpart. Across both normal and crisis
scenarios, the diﬀerences are very similar, indicating the similarities
in the initial T time periods for both sections 4.2 and 4.3.
26
A noticeable feature of the bottom-right panel of ﬁgure 14 is that the dashed
and dotted lines are in the negative territory. However, this is not surprising given
the baseline paths of adaptive learning and rational expectations in the top-right
panel of ﬁgure 2. Overall, as the value of the forward guidance shock enlarges,
the diﬀerence between the two expectations formation schemes grows.
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Figure 14. Diﬀerence between Impulse Response
Functions of Rational Expectations and Adaptive
Learning to Forward Guidance Shocks under Diﬀerent
Value in Period T + 1
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Table 3. Matrix Norm of Adaptive Learning Coeﬃcient
Matrices Minus REE Coeﬃcient Matrices

||aT
||bT
||cT
||dT
||eT

– ā||
– b̄||
– c̄||
¯
– d||
– ē||

Normal Times

Crisis Times

0.0205
0.0304
0.0006
0.0002
0.0002

0.0207
0.0317
0.0007
0.0002
0.0002

Notes: aT , bT , cT , dT , and eT denote the adaptive learning coeﬃcient matrices
¯ and ē represent the rational expectations
at the end of time period T . ā, b̄, c̄, d,
counterparts.
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Conclusion

The 2007–09 global ﬁnancial crisis caused central banks around the
world to implement the unconventional monetary policy of forward
guidance to stimulate their economies. The eﬀectiveness of forward
guidance hinges on two key channels—expectations and ﬁnancial
markets—that are largely overlooked in standard macroeconomic
models. The standard expectations formation assumption is the
rational expectations hypothesis, while frictionless ﬁnancial markets are largely assumed for convenience. Thus, it is of interest to
investigate the eﬀectiveness of forward guidance when the rational
expectations assumption has been relaxed and credit frictions are
included.
This paper utilizes a medium-scale DSGE model with ﬁnancial frictions to compare the eﬀects of forward guidance under both
rational expectations and adaptive learning. The results show that
the addition of ﬁnancial markets into a DSGE model ampliﬁes
the diﬀerences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance statements. Adaptive learning agents do
not respond as strongly to a forward guidance shock relative to
their rational expectations counterparts. During a period of economic crisis (e.g., a recession), output under rational expectations
also displays more favorable responses to forward guidance than
under adaptive learning. Rational expectations agents form their
forecasts based on the true model of the economy and, thus, can
understand how forward guidance will precisely help the economy.
However, adaptive learning agents must estimate the eﬀects of forward guidance on the economy, as their forecasts are based on
an econometric model of the economy. In addition, the diﬀerences
between the responses of rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance decrease as the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions
in the model diminishes. Furthermore, these results are especially
important to policymakers. If they want to understand the eﬀects
of forward guidance on the economy, monetary policymakers should
consider the way in which expectations and ﬁnancial frictions are
modeled.
There are other modiﬁcations to the model presented in this
paper that are worth noting. For example, the credibility of central bank forward guidance announcements could be examined as
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in Dong (2015). In the model presented above, agents believe the
forward guidance statements, and the central bank implements its
forward guidance promises. However, the results could be examined
when agents do not completely believe that the central bank will
follow through with its forward guidance statements. The type of
forward guidance could also be changed. This current paper examines time-contingent forward guidance, in which the central bank
communicates the end date of forward guidance. Forward guidance
could be state contingent, in which the completion date of central
bank forward guidance is linked to economic conditions (e.g., unemployment rate and output). The RLS formula could also be modiﬁed
to allow agents to better track structural changes in the economy as
described in Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Milani (2014). Speciﬁcally, the gain parameter would be a constant if the recent prediction
errors were large and would be decreasing if the recent prediction
errors were small. Overall, the roles of expectations and ﬁnancial
frictions are important to understand when examining the eﬀects of
forward guidance on the economy.
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